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Abstract 
Information providing and gathering increasingly involve technologies like search 
engines, which actively shape their epistemic surroundings. Yet, a satisfying 
account of the epistemic responsibilities associated with them does not exist. We 
analyze automatically generated search suggestions from the perspective of social 
epistemology to illustrate how epistemic responsibilities associated with a 
technology can be derived and assigned. Drawing on our previously developed 
theoretical framework that connects responsible epistemic behavior to 
practicability, we address two questions: first, given the different technological 
possibilities available to searchers, the search technology, and search providers, 
who should bear which responsibilities? Second, given the technology’s 
epistemically relevant features and potential harms, how should search terms be 
autocompleted? Our analysis reveals that epistemic responsibility lies mostly with 
search providers, which should eliminate three categories of autosuggestions: 
those that result from organized attacks, those that perpetuate damaging 
stereotypes, and those that associate negative characteristics with specific 
individuals. 
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In 2012, Bettina Wulff, former German President’s ex-wife, sued Google for 
defamation. When searching for “Bettina Wulff,” Google automatically suggested 
words such as “prostitute” and “escort” (Niggemeier, 2012).1 Some of Google’s 
autosuggestions also reflect prejudices and stereotypes, for example, “Why do gay 
men ... get AIDS” or “Why do Jews ... have big noses” (Baker and Potts, 2013). A 2013 
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ad campaign for UN Women, which aims at demonstrating the pervasiveness of 
discrimination against women, features women’s mouths covered with real Google 
autosuggestions, such as “Women shouldn’t ... have rights” and “Women need to ... 
be disciplined” (Figure 1) (Mahdawi, 2013). 
In legal cases such as Wulff’s, Google has claimed its autosuggestions merely 
objectively reflect its users’ interests (Jordans, 2013; Niggemeier, 2012). 
Nevertheless, Google officially refrains from autocompleting queries “related to 
pornography, violence, hate speech, and copyright infringement” (Google, 2014). In 
2013, Google eliminated the autosuggestion “autistic people should ... die” (O’Brien, 
2013); in 2011, Google was criticized for caving in to pressure from the 
entertainment industry when it stopped autosuggesting torrent-download sites 
(Ernesto, 2011). 
Search autocomplete raises normative questions—ethical, political, and legal.2 
We address its epistemic dimensions. We ask how search queries can be responsibly 
autocompleted from an epistemic perspective. Our analysis draws on our 
previously developed account of the relations between technological possibilities 
and responsible epistemic conduct (Miller and Record, 2013; Record, 2013). 
Theoretical framework 
Our analysis is from the theoretical perspective of social epistemology, which is the 
branch of philosophy that studies the social dimensions of knowledge. While 
sociologists of mass media knowledge study how knowledge claims in the media 
gain social and political legitimacy (Ettema and Glasser, 1987; Ekström, 2002; 
Parasie and Dagiral, 2013; Rogers and Ben-David, 2008), philosophers—
specifically, social epistemologists—are interested in their epistemic validity, 
analyzed in terms of rationality, evidence, truth, and so on. Social epistemologists 
widely acknowledge that epistemic validity and socio-political legitimacy are 
closely intertwined (Fricker, 2007; Longino, 2002; Solomon, 2001). 
Social epistemologists of digital and social media engage in normative epistemic 
evaluation of Internet platforms and practices, such as blogging (Coady, 2011; 
Goldman, 2008; Munn, 2012; Turner, 2013), googling (Simpson, 2012), ranking 
(Origgi, 2012; Simpson, 2011), user-anonymity (Frost-Arnold, 2014), 
crowdsourced GPS (Global Positioning System) navigation (Record and Miller, 
2016), and Wikipedia (De Laat, 2011; Fallis, 2011; Magnus, 2009; Wray, 2009). A 
related project analyzes Internet phenomena to re-examine traditional epistemic 
notions such as knowledge, justification, trust, and testimony, with an eye to 
epistemically bettering current online practices (Freiman, 2014; Lynch, 2016; 
Miller and Record, 2013; Record and Miller, 2016; Simon, 2010; Tollefsen, 2009; 
Weinberger, 2011). 
This article’s treatment of autocomplete illustrates a principled theoretical basis 
for allocating epistemic responsibilities. We increasingly embed knowledge practices 
in technological infrastructures that, together with our competencies to manipulate 
them, constrain what is practicable for us to know and do. Our theoretical framework  
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Figure 1. An ad from the United Nations (UN) Women campaign, which features real 
autosuggestions. 
(Miller and Record, 2013; Record, 2013) acknowledges and accounts for these 
technologies and the social structures that form around them. It states that what we 
can know depends on what we can do in practice, which depends on the available 
material and conceptual resources. New technology makes certain previously 
impracticable actions practicable. Such new possibilities effectively change existing 
standards of epistemic responsibility, which in turn change existing standards of 
epistemic justification. For example, it is impossible to know that the surface of the 
moon is not smooth without observing it with a telescope. It was technologically 
possible to build a telescope in 1610, but not in 1210; thus, it was possible to have 
that knowledge in 1610, but not in 1210. 
An epistemically responsible subject does, inasmuch as she can, what is required 
of her to bring about true and rational beliefs. Responsibility is delimited in part by 
role-expectations. Practicability is delimited by the subject’s competencies and her 
technological, ethical, and economic circumstances. Practicability sets an upper 
limit on responsibility in that a responsible subject need not do more than what is 
practicable. It sets a lower limit on responsibility, because when an inquiry or 
validation becomes practicable, performing it tends to become a minimal 
requirement for forming responsible beliefs on relevant matters. The more 
practicable a putative epistemic justification-increasing activity is, the likelier that 
it would be included among the subject’s responsibilities. 
Previously, we focused on search-engine users’ epistemic responsibilities, while 
here we extend the analysis to information providers. We argue that autocomplete 
inevitably and irreparably induces changes in users’ epistemic actions, particularly 
their inquiry and belief formation. These changes have potential epistemic benefits 
and harms to individual users and society. We identify these changes and explain 
how autocomplete should prevent or minimize harms. Our methodology can be 
easily extrapolated to other technologies. 
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Technical overview 
We first examine the workings of autocomplete technology. From a user’s 
perspective, autosuggestions spontaneously appear adjacent to the typed contents 
of the search box, for example, as a dropdown list. As she types, the suggestions 
update accordingly. At any time, she can select a suggestion and is immediately 
transferred to a new page with relevant search hits. In some implementations, the 
entire hits page corresponding to the “best-guess” autosuggestion is displayed and 
updated as the user types. 
Well-functioning autocomplete features rely on several technical components 
that have only recently come together. Algorithms for quick fetching of spelling 
corrections have been used since the 1960s. So have data structures for quickly 
predicting terms from an index (Knuth, 1998: Chapter 6). But search engine 
autocomplete also requires responding to users’ input in real time. Real-time 
communication became practical only after certain browser, server, and 
communication technologies became widely available. Traditionally, a web user 
would work on a browser on the client side and have to initiate sending information 
to a remote server by pressing a “send” button, clicking a hyperlink, or typing a URL. 
The client would then wait for the server to respond. This synchronous 
communication architecture suited slow networks, which could not efficiently 
handle continuous rapid back-and-forth transmissions.3 Only around 2004, when 
high-speed infrastructure improved and reached the common household, was 
interactive real-time communication developed (Garrett, 2005). 
Autocomplete hinges on the ability to prompt the user with the most relevant 
suggestions, which depends on the quality of the index. Current indexing methods 
use a vector-space model, in which sets of keywords are represented as vectors in 
higher dimensional space. Relevant suggestions are taken from similar vectors as 
measured by the “distance” between vectors (Hiemstra, 2009). Statistical analyses 
are also heavily used. These techniques require brute computing power and vast 
memory space, which only became practical around 2000. 
Autosuggestions depend on many ad hoc implementation decisions. We can 
make informed guesses about the factors influencing autosuggestions. The number 
of queries for a term is a major factor and so are the number of click-throughs, the 
user’s geographic location, and her personal use history. Other relevant factors 
include the number of hits and their quality, diversity across domain names, search 
language, explicit occurrence of terms in search hits, and trends among users (BBC 
News, 2012; Sullivan, 2011; Wiideman, 2011).4 
Autocomplete is susceptible to manipulation. Manipulability raises concerns 
about the objectivity of autosuggestions. There are several recorded successful 
attempts to manipulate Google’s autocomplete, for example, using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing system, by having many users on different 
machines search the same terms (Sullivan, 2011; Wiideman, 2011). In 2013, an 
Israeli plaintiff won a defamation case against Google for making defamatory 
autosuggestions when searching for his name. His lawyers manipulated the Google 
interface to suggest “takes chocolate milk” when searching the judge’s name. They 
claimed they could have easily manipulated it to autosuggest “takes bribe” 
(Anonymous, 2013). 
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Epistemically relevant features of autocomplete 
Autocomplete introduces novel distinctive technological possibilities, which 
according to our theoretical framework impose novel epistemic responsibilities. 
First, autosuggestions result from many individuals’ collective search behavior. 
This may help users draw attention to aspects they might otherwise have neglected, 
although the mere fact that something is popular does not guarantee its correctness 
or usefulness. In popular searches, a user’s impact on autosuggestions other users 
see is negligible, but in unpopular searches, such as manipulation cases, an 
individual or a small group may have substantial influence. 
Second, autosuggestions are generated automatically, without a human being’s 
direct involvement. This distinguishes autocomplete from human testimony and 
other practices that social epistemologists usually study. Automaticity and lack of 
supervision raise questions about the system’s reliability and capacity to correct 
mistakes. 
Third, autosuggestions are subject to a feedback loop—the more people choose 
a suggestion, the likelier it is to reappear. Popular autosuggestions become more 
popular, while unpopular autosuggestions wither. This ampliative effect has 
epistemic implications, insofar as searchers deem the results representative. 
Searchers seeking information on unpopular topics may have to enter very precise 
search terms without the aid of autosuggestions before they find the desired 
results. Meanwhile, sensational details may propagate unchecked. Autocomplete 
may operate more like a rumor mill than a reference librarian. 
Fourth, users’ exposure to autosuggestions is involuntary.5 Users cannot type a 
search without encountering autosuggestions. Once seen, they cannot “unsee” the 
results. A searcher seeking the airtime of her favorite television program, for 
example, might see an autosuggestion that “spoils” the next episode by revealing 
crucial plot information. 
Psychology suggests two likely consequences of involuntary exposure. First, 
initially disregarded associations sometimes transform into beliefs because 
humans are prone to source-monitoring errors: subjects mistake the original 
information source and may put more or less credence in the information than they 
would have given the correct source (e.g. Johnson et al., 1993).6 Someone might 
read “Bettina Wulff prostitute” and initially disregard it, but later, having forgotten 
the source, recall having read it. This is supported by the sleeper effect, according 
to which when people receive a message with a discounting cue, they are less 
persuaded by it immediately than later in time (Kumkale and Albarracín, 2004).7 
Second, involuntary exposure to certain autosuggestions may reinforce unwanted 
beliefs. Humans are bad at identifying and rooting out their implicit biases (Kenyon, 
2014). Because exposure is involuntary, even subjects hygienic in their epistemic 
practices may be negatively affected. 
Fifth, autosuggestions interactively affect a user’s inquiry, leading to paths she 
might not have pursued otherwise. Effectively, if a user looks at the screen, she can’t 
help but see the autosuggestions, and these impressions can affect her inquiry. 
Autosuggestions may seem to a user to delimit the possible options or represent 
what most people find relevant, either of which may change her search behavior. 
She may change her search terms for one of the suggestions, add or subtract 
additional terms to rule out or in suggested results. She may abandon her search 
altogether because the autosuggestions seem to provide the answer or indicate that 
there is no answer to be found that is she may assume that because nothing is being 
- 6 - 
suggested, no results for the query exist. Furthermore, because the displayed 
information may be incomplete or out of context, she might reach a different 
conclusion on the basis of autosuggestions than if she actually visited the linked 
page. 
Altering a user’s path of inquiry can have positive effects, as when he is exposed 
to relevant information he might not have encountered given his chosen search 
terms. But the effects may also be negative. For example, the first woman in space 
was Soviet cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova, but when a user types “first woman 
in space,” Google autosuggests “Ride”—a reference to Sally Ride—the first 
American woman in space. Some users follow this autosuggestion into a wrong path 
of inquiry (White and Marchionini, 2007: 701). Such derails in inquiry may be 
deleterious—as when a searcher seeks information about a vaccination’s side-
effects and is led to persuasive anti-vaccination websites promoting the now-
discredited idea that vaccines cause autism. 
Finally, autosuggestions affect users’ belief formation process in a real-time 
interactive and responsive manner. “It helps to complete a thought,” as one user put 
this (Ward et al., 2012: 12). They may thus generate beliefs the user might not have 
had. Based on autosuggestions, I might erroneously believe that President Obama 
is a Muslim, Bettina Wulff was a prostitute, vaccines cause autism, women should 
stay out of the workforce, or Sally Ride was the first-ever woman in space. 
Alternatively, I might come to believe that these things are possible, where before I 
held no beliefs about them, or I might give these propositions more credence than 
I would otherwise. Autocomplete is like talking with someone constantly cutting 
you off trying to finish your sentences. This can be annoying when the person is 
way off base or pleasant when he seems like your mind-reading soulmate. Either 
way, it has a distracting, attention-shifting effect that other interactive interface 
technologies lack. 
Other technologies share some features of autocomplete. We are involuntarily 
exposed to advertisements; non-autocompleted search is subject to a feedback 
loop; and autocomplete interfaces in applications other than web search, for 
example, autocompleted email addresses in an email client, may also alter their 
users’ belief formation processes in real time. But no other technology has all six 
features. From the perspective of our theoretical framework, this means that 
autocompleted search introduces new technological possibilities, which may entail 
new epistemic responsibilities. 
Epistemic virtues and harms of autocomplete 
Autocomplete has potential virtues. Empirical studies (Kato et al., 2013; Ward et al., 
2012; White and Marchionini, 2007) find that it increases the speed of human–
computer interactions and improves the quality of results, especially for slow 
typists or poor spellers (spelling correction is one of its most common uses); 
autocomplete disambiguates search terms, alerts users to possibilities beyond the 
ones they envisioned, or, conversely, narrows down their search and makes it more 
specific; it makes some users more confident that what they are looking for is out 
there because they are not the first to look for it. In addition, the technology has a 
didactic effect: it teaches users how to search by exemplifying common search 
constructions. Finally, autocomplete enhances users’ meta-knowledge about the 
views and interests in society, especially politically incorrect views, which may be 
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underrepresented in mainstream channels. For example, without autocomplete, 
one may not know that others wonder whether Obama is Muslim. 
The effects of autocomplete, though, vary for different users. For example, 
autocomplete helps dyslectic users search more effectively and reach performance 
levels equivalent to those of non-dyslectic users (Berget and Sandnes, 2015), while 
it cognitively overloads elderly users, thus derogating from the effectiveness of 
their search (Doubé and Beh, 2012). 
Autocomplete also has drawbacks. Following Fricker’s (2007: 9–29) analysis of 
testimonial injustice, we identify three potential harms of autocomplete. First, the 
search target’s dignity and autonomy may be harmed due to the spread of 
misinformation about them. Such misinformation may be about a specific 
individual, as in Wullf’s case, or about minority or disempowered-group members, 
as in the prejudicial suggestions about gays, Jews, or the Māori (Baker and Potts, 
2013; Elers, 2014). Second, the searcher is harmed when she develops false, biased, 
or skewed beliefs. As noted, autocomplete may interfere in the midst of a searcher’s 
stream of thought or process of inquiry and divert it toward forming biased beliefs. 
Third, society as a whole is harmed when prejudicial, biased, or false beliefs about 
members of different groups in society lead to the incorrect assessment of the 
trustworthiness of informants who belong to these groups and, consequently, to 
blocking the circulation of critical ideas in society. 
Autocomplete perpetuates prejudicial beliefs in subtler ways than merely 
making autosuggestions that state prejudicial stereotypes. A study of Google 
autosuggestions found that American parents are 2.5 times more likely to Google 
“Is my son gifted?” than “Is my daughter gifted?” and twice as likely to Google “Is 
my daughter overweight?” than “Is my son overweight?” Parents are generally 
more concerned with their daughters’ looks and their sons’ intellectual abilities. 
Not only do these queries reflect parents’ gender-differentiated treatment of their 
children, their rates are misaligned with an American reality in which boys are 9% 
more likely to be overweight than girls, while girls are 11% more likely to be in a 
gifted program (Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014). Not only does autocomplete 
perpetuate googling parents’ stereotypical beliefs about boys and girls due to its 
feedback loop, but because of its involuntariness and real-time interference in its 
users’ belief formation processes, it can also plant ideas such as that their daughter 
might be overweight in parents who did not entertain such thoughts before. 
Assigning responsibility in the autocomplete case 
How can and should the harms of autocomplete be rectified? According to our 
theoretical framework, technological possibility constitutes a salient factor in 
determining lower and upper bounds on epistemic responsibility. We therefore 
need to answer two questions (which we do in this section and in the “Epistemically 
responsible autocomplete” section, respectively). First, given the different 
technological possibilities available to the different parties (searchers, the search 
technology itself, and search providers), who should bear which responsibilities? 
Second, given the epistemically relevant features of the technology and its harms, 
how should search terms be responsibly autocompleted? We argue that the 
epistemic responsibility lies mostly with the search provider rather than searchers 
or the technology itself and that the prospects of devising a purely technological 
solution are grim due to inherent properties of the technology. 
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Who should bear epistemic responsibility for the harms of autocomplete? There 
are four options: holding the searchers collectively responsible, holding the 
searchers individually responsible, holding the technology responsible, and holding 
the search provider responsible. We will consider each candidate in turn. 
Can we hold searchers collectively responsible? Assuming that corporate bodies 
may be held responsible as collectives, independently of their individual members,8 
we may seemingly assign collective epistemic responsibility to a group of people 
who make the same problematic searches or click on the same problematic 
autosuggestions, and thus influence the suggestions that others see. However, all 
accounts of collective responsibility require that a group has minimal internal 
structure and cohesion for bearing responsibility as a group. The collective typically 
has neither the information nor the organizational structure to consider the effect 
of its aggregate behavior or produce a coordinated response to such predictions. 
The only thing that unites members of the group is that they have used the same 
search terms. The group thus cannot assume collective responsibility.9 But there 
are exceptions. Concerted efforts to manipulate search results by crowdsourcing 
appear to meet the cohesion requirement because participants explicitly elect to 
participate. Likewise, actions by a hacker activist group probably qualify. For the 
purposes of this article, however, we focus on typical individual searchers’ 
aggregate behavior. 
What about holding searchers individually responsible? This is tricky because 
not every individual performing a problematic search acts in an epistemically 
irresponsible way. A searcher need not be biased to make a problematic search. 
Suppose the view that the Ferengi are greedy reflects a prejudicial stereotype. 
Typing the query “Why are the Ferengi greedy?” is not always epistemically 
irresponsible because one may type such a query without believing it, for example, 
to identify who holds this view. Even if someone types a query that reflects a 
prejudicial belief, she still might not be epistemically irresponsible. Rather, typing 
the query and reading the search results may help her encounter alternative views, 
correct her errant belief, and become aware of its prejudicial nature. Epistemic 
responsibilities might demand that individuals explore additional search terms 
rather than avoiding particular ones. Indeed, the recommendation to seek out 
additional sources accords with our previous findings regarding search engines 
generally (Miller and Record, 2013). 
One may respond that typing a problematic query is not epistemically 
irresponsible for its epistemic effects on the searcher, but its side-effects for other 
searchers. This is similar to an individual’s moral responsibility to refrain from 
unnecessarily driving her car or consuming too much because of the negative 
environmental side-effects of such actions. Thicke (2013) dubs this the “Internet 
Observer Effect,” which is that “any time you do anything on the internet; it affects 
the epistemic landscape of not just yourself, but everyone else who uses the 
internet.” Thicke gives the example of searching for an individual who has offensive 
views about rape. Merely searching for this author and “rape” could cause Google’s 
algorithms to associate the author more closely with “rape,” causing his website to 
be ranked higher when others search for “rape,” ultimately influencing people’s 
beliefs about what counts as rape. 
Nevertheless, assigning individual responsibility to searchers, or at least the bulk 
of responsibility, is wrong. Many searchers are unaware of the negative epistemic 
implications of their actions. Even when they are, they do not know how their 
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actions affect the autosuggestions others encounter. Even if a searcher knew how 
her search affected others’ autosuggestions, she had no control over this process. 
She could refrain from searching at all, but this all-or-nothing alternative seems 
disproportionate to the epistemic risks, especially considering the potential 
rewards of autocomplete. 
One may object that ignorance of how technology works is not always a valid 
defense for epistemically irresponsible action. Indeed, we advocate this view 
elsewhere (Miller and Record, 2013). A responsible subject should typically do 
what she can to ensure the information upon which she forms her beliefs is 
unbiased and complete enough to underwrite her judgments. Elsewhere, we argued 
that this entails a duty to ensure that her information sources are unbiased, 
especially when she does not know how they work. But the current worry is not 
about her own beliefs, but the potential harm to others’ beliefs, whom she may not 
even know. Extending a subject’s epistemic responsibilities to consider indirect 
harm to others’ beliefs goes too far. Searching is distinct from cases of testimony or 
expert testimony, where extending epistemic responsibility to consider indirect 
harms may be appropriate. 
A second reason why an individual searcher should not bear (much) 
responsibility is that the effect of her actions is typically minuscule. The 
infinitesimal effect of a single search suggests that the searcher’s share of 
responsibility is similarly infinitesimal. Individual searches influence the behavior 
of the algorithm, but this influence is typically so dilute as to be almost irrelevant in 
practice. 
The third candidate for having epistemic responsibility for autocomplete is the 
technology itself. One might immediately object that responsibility is inherently 
tied to human judgment and cannot be ascribed to technology. However, some 
argue that technologies could be bearers of responsibility. According to Latour 
(2002), traditional ethics unjustifiably distinguishes judgments about 
responsibilities, which it deems moral, from judgments about which means best 
serve which ends, which it deems morally neutral. But available means and the 
certainty of our judgments about them delimit the space of possible ends, which in 
turn delimits the space of responsibilities and obligations. This makes means 
themselves moral entities because they perform moral roles and constitute moral 
ends (cf. Adam, 2008). 
Latour further describes how technological agents perform their social function 
in a “relentlessly moral” fashion. The hydraulic door closer vigorously shuts the 
door on those laden with packages or infirm with age. They plead or curse in vain, 
for the door closer cannot be convinced or bribed (Latour, 1988). Similarly, the 
speed bump equally slows down the reckless speeding driver and the ambulance 
pressed for time (Latour, 1996: 9).10 Autocomplete has similar moralizing effects. 
By suggesting certain search terms, autocomplete encourages searchers to trust 
them to yield helpful results. It didactically leads users to enter different, potentially 
better search terms.  
Relentless, moral algorithms cannot be convinced or bribed to show different 
results. But does that make them responsible for their behavior? We avoid the 
principled ontological question of whether artifacts can be proper moral agents and 
pursue a targeted inquiry into the technological possibilities presently available. 
We ask whether autocomplete can de facto reliably perform the epistemic 
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responsibilities accompanying autocomplete. Insofar as it cannot, the responsibility 
must lie at a qualified human agent. 
Regardless of whether technology can be a proper moral agent, there is a 
prevalent tendency, especially among technologists, of thinking that the solutions 
to the sort of problems we raised should be primarily technological or algorithmic. 
Implementing this thought would amount in practice to letting technology resolve 
questions of appropriate autocomplete. We argue against this option and insist that 
discharging technology alone with responsible autocomplete is not practicable. 
So why can’t an algorithm make epistemically responsible autosuggestions 
avoiding the harms discussed in the “Epistemic virtues and harms of autocomplete” 
section? Algorithms cannot autonomously identify which alternatives might harm 
subjects’ belief formation processes. Moreover, if we take additional inspiration 
from Fricker’s (2007) analysis of testimonial injustice, to correct for the harms of 
epistemic injustice, a biased subject should reflectively revise his prejudices over 
time, when the evidence he encounters does not support them. An algorithm seems 
incapable of this. The algorithm would need to identify which suggestions are 
offensive or prejudicial and know the actual state of affairs. For example, in the “is 
my son ... gifted” and “is my daughter ... overweight” case, discussed in the 
“Epistemic virtues and harms of autocomplete” section, the algorithm would need 
to know the actual rate of giftedness in boys and obesity in girls to know how 
frequently to make these suggestions. And even this would be insufficient for 
responsibly autocompleting individual queries, unless the search provider had data 
about the specific user’s children to know which suggestions are most appropriate. 
Judgments regarding harmfulness are context-sensitive, while current text and 
data analysis algorithms are not. Similar or even identical texts, keywords, and 
pictures may be offensive in some contexts and not others. Morozov (2013: 140–143) 
describes two examples where Google’s algorithms made a wrong automatic 
judgment. In the first, they banned a respectable highbrow magazine from Google’s 
AdSense program for publishing a story by a renowned author about a man’s sexual 
experiences because they deemed it pornographic. In the second case, they banned a 
Nigerian political activist’s site for posting photos protesting against police brutality 
in Nigeria because they deemed them as too violent. Society has different standards 
for treating nudity, violence, and so on in different contexts. It matters whether they 
appear in a museum, an encyclopedia, or a top-shelf magazine. Current technology 
faces insurmountable difficulties implementing subtle context-sensitive standards 
required for responsible autocomplete. 
Kuflik (1999) lists several additional limitations of computing technology, which 
militate against discharging responsibilities to unsupervised computers. These 
limitations are principled in that they are inherent to the operating principles of 
code-running digital machines; thus, they cannot be overcome by mere 
improvements of computational power. First, testing large software is difficult 
because there are many more possible than testable inputs. Thus, software 
reliability greatly depends on the inputs its testers could predict in advance. 
Additionally, correcting one error can introduce new errors. While developers try 
to design software modularly, there can be unanticipated dependencies between 
modules. Moreover, small errors in the input or code can lead to large and 
significant errors in the output. Recent examples include a person charged 
US$81 billion on his credit card for filling a gas tank (Trumbo, 2009) and a used 
book posted on Amazon for US$23 million by automatic pricing algorithms (Eisen, 
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2011). These stories are newsworthy for their piquancy, but similar errors are 
common, and fixing them is part of many programmers’ routine. For these reasons, 
responsibility must ultimately lie in human hands. 
Two practicable options for making sensitive judgments are allowing users to 
flag harmful autosuggestions and blacklisting certain terms. But in each case, 
responsibility clearly lies with the users or programmers—not the algorithm. 
Indeed, programmers intervene just this way to alter autosuggestions. There is a 
blacklist of phrases that Google would not autosuggest. All major search engines 
refrain from autocompleting pornographic queries. This is evident in Figure 2, 
where only the small search engine Babylon makes sexually explicit suggestions. 
Blacklisting policies constitute a tacit admission that (1) there are undesirable 
responses, (2) the algorithms do not weed them out, and (3) programmers can 
intervene effectively to correct flaws in the algorithm. Search providers hold 
themselves responsible for some results of unsupervised algorithms. It may be 
argued that these interventions are relatively narrow: they only intend to filter out 
“bad” words, sexually explicit suggestions, and some Internet back alleys. But the 
scope of intervention is irrelevant. Providers can and do alter the algorithm to 
remove certain autosuggestions. 
The final site for autocomplete responsibility is the search company. Because we 
arrived here by elimination, let us ensure we have not been hasty. One may raise 
several reasons why creators of complex algorithms should not be held (fully) 
responsible. First is the “many hands” problem, which suggests that programmers 
are not individually responsible because software projects are typically created by 
large dispersed teams where the causal connection between any programmer and 
the searcher may be negligible (Friedman, 1990; Jonas, 1984; Nissenbaum, 1994). 
Furthermore, software projects combine off-the-shelf code packages with their 
own, which the programmers cannot test. We think this insulates individual 
programmers from responsibility for parts of the system, but does not insulate the 
corporate entity controlling the algorithm from responsibility. 
The temporal and physical separation between the provider and individual 
searches militates against holding the provider directly responsible for a specific 
unanticipated harm. We think this argument holds some weight. Providers should 
not be responsible for every epistemic harm caused by their algorithm. But in 
certain well-described cases, like the Bettina Wulff case or the reinforcement of 
negative stereotypes about disenfranchised groups, search providers can intervene 
to curtail harmful suggestions once identified. 
Another reason to doubt that search providers bear much responsibility is that 
user behavior is unpredictable. Unanticipated epistemic practices regarding 
autocomplete would seem to relieve the provider of responsibility. Search 
providers, however, already monitor user behavior, and even if they do not 
anticipate every new use of autocomplete, they can identify trending topics, review 
them for potential harms, and remove them from autosuggestions before they 
cause widespread harm. 
Taken together, features of autocomplete like temporal and physical distance 
between the originator and user, combined with unpredictable user behavior, 
relieve the provider of some responsibility for some epistemic harms. But they do 
not shield them. Although muted by time and distance, providers are in causal 
contact with each individual search. Providers cannot typically intervene in an 
individual search, but providers may intervene to affect aggregate search behavior, 
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as they already do by blacklisting certain autosuggestions, either through user 
settings like Google’s SafeSearch or by fiat. Given the kind of intervention 
technologically possible, search providers have a responsibility to the aggregate, 
not to each individual. 
Finally, only search providers have the autonomy to significantly change the 
algorithm functioning. Typical users change the algorithm only incrementally. The 
algorithm itself includes self-modifying code, but its scope is narrow and 
unreflective to be left operating unsupervised. Only search providers have the 
autonomy necessary to bear the bulk of epistemic responsibility. 
 
Figure 2. Autosuggestions for “gay” in four search engines (2 April 2013). 
Epistemically responsible autocomplete 
Which autosuggestions should be monitored? We identified three harms of 
irresponsible autocomplete. First, a search target’s dignity can be harmed due to 
the spread of misinformation about them. Second, autosuggestions may contribute 
to false, biased, or skewed beliefs in searchers. Third, extant biases can lead to 
incorrectly assessing the trustworthiness of informants who belong to certain 
groups and hinder the circulation of critical ideas in society. The first harm is moral, 
but the others are epistemic. We will focus on them. Our analysis entails that 
providers should eliminate at least three broad categories of autosuggestions: first, 
those that result from organized attacks to game the system; second, those that 
perpetuate damaging stereotypes about socially disadvantaged groups; and third, 
those that libel specific individuals. 
Search providers already invest heavily in preventing attempts by “search 
engine optimizers” to artificially associate a website with popular search terms or 
- 13 - 
using robots or confederates to inflate its popularity directly. Whenever someone 
“games” the system, the overall quality of the search is damaged, so providers have 
selfish motives to monitor these abuses. But such efforts also have epistemic effects: 
whenever artificially inflated results are rejected, what remains is a better 
reflection of the Web makeup. Of course, the Web itself is full of misinformation and 
often biased toward privileged groups (Introna and Nissenbaum, 1999; Rogers, 
2004: 3–9), but considering whether search providers are responsible to correct 
these features exceeds the scope of this article. 
Second, search providers are responsible to counter damaging stereotypes 
about socially disadvantaged groups because they are likely to reinforce users’ 
biases. Stereotypes are especially damaging to groups without online bandwidth to 
counter them. Smaller, less privileged, poorer groups have a quieter voice on the 
Web, and the automaticity and feedback of autosuggestions can amplify these 
differences—so that common stereotypes appear frequently, while the contrary 
perspective shrinks disproportionately from view. Our prescription allows search 
providers to avoid compounding the propagation of such stereotypes by 
autosuggesting them without actually correcting the search results themselves. 
Finally, individuals face major difficulties battling slanderous autosuggestions. 
Such autosuggestions should be avoided. Anyone interested in Wulff’s alleged 
salacious life could type “Bettina Wulff prostitute” and find the same information 
they would if the search term were suggested. But defamatory autosuggestions 
should not spontaneously appear to whoever simply types “Bettina Wulff.” 
Objections 
Let us last consider potential objections. First, speech should be protected on the 
Internet. Censorship is bad. We agree. But omitting autosuggestions is not 
censoring search results. The distinction is between finding information one is 
seeking and being involuntarily informed that certain information exists. Typing a 
full query invoking a stereotype would still yield the same hits as if it were 
autosuggested. Even searchers who do not explicitly invoke stereotypes in their 
queries will likely encounter them in the search results. But under our policy, these 
individuals would not have the stereotype thrust in their faces without context. 
Someone searching for information about, say, the history of an ethnic group would 
not be exposed to autosuggestions denigrating it. We do acknowledge a risk. 
Eliminating some autosuggestions could limit the “coverage” search engines 
provide and lead users to believe they have the whole story when some aspects of 
the story are withheld. 
A related objection is that search providers should represent the Web as 
accurately and with little interference as possible. According to Rogers (2004: 28) 
and Rieder (2009: 143, 148), the Web is and ought to remain “a valuable collision 
space between official and unofficial accounts of reality.” They claim that the Web 
forms a non-hierarchical structure, where each page can link to other pages. A 
hyperlink is “an acknowledgement by one organization of another organization’s 
relevance to the discourse, based on some appreciation for that latter 
organization’s knowledge and reputation” (Rogers, 2002: 203). This makes the 
Web a neutral playground for different accounts of reality to compete for credibility 
by trying to get as many incoming hyperlinks as possible. The most hyperlinked 
webpages are perceived as most credible. Conflicting accounts of reality may gain 
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credibility within different clusters of webpages. Any interference by search 
providers in this naturally occurring hyperlinking structure would wrongly infringe 
an organic web-neutrality. 
We question the assumptions underpinning this argument. Even if the Web once 
had a non-hierarchical structure, most traffic today occurs in a few mega-sites, such 
as Facebook and YouTube, which only partly implement a traditional static 
hyperlinks structure. Furthermore, are aggregated hyperlinks a good indicator of 
perceived credibility? Can we legitimately infer actual credibility from perceived 
credibility? We cannot delve into these issues here.11 In any case, this objection 
applies only to search results, not autosuggestions. Autosuggestions are not 
intended to merely reflect an allegedly objective structure of the Web, but also 
users’ search interests and patterns. Searches do not have a hyperlinked 
structure—they do not link to one another—therefore, this objection is irrelevant 
to them. 
It might be argued that autocomplete should only neutrally and objectively 
represent searchers’ interests because this is the best way to serve individual 
searchers’ needs. Any other agenda, including avoiding epistemic harms, exceeds 
search providers’ mandate. As noted, this is Google’s official line, but in practice, 
Google and other providers do not follow it to the letter. They refrain from 
autocompleting searches for pornography, torrent sites, and some offensive 
content. Their de facto policies seem neither consistent nor defensible. Their 
pretense to neutrality and objectivity looks more like a façade for avoiding liability 
than a genuine commitment to users’ best interests. 
But suppose we take their claim to neutrality at face value. Is such a policy 
epistemically responsible? Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that when a 
father who worries that his daughter is overweight starts typing a query “is my 
daughter,” it should be autocompleted with “overweight?” because this reflects his 
actual concern (even if unsubstantiated or prejudicial). Even so, such 
autosuggestions are epistemically irresponsible in aggregate because the search 
interface does not and cannot make such autosuggestions only to parents already 
concerned about their daughter’s weight. It makes the same autosuggestion to 
nearly all users who start typing the same query, including people who have not 
had this thought. Such autosuggestions epistemically harm many users by 
reinforcing or planting prejudicial unsubstantiated thoughts. Even if autocomplete 
benefits users who are explicitly searching for this information, its potential harms 
to users looking for other information outweigh any alleged benefits. 
Finally, search providers may object that rooting out prejudices is too 
burdensome. They would need to hire and train human minders to evaluate 
trending topics for potentially epistemically harmful content. Indeed, this may be 
overly burdensome for search providers to prevent all such harms. But the 
responsibility is to respond to aggregate behavior. The idea is to prevent the 
algorithm’s damaging ampliative effects from swamping the unbiased or counter-
biased alternative. 
Conclusion 
Autocompleted web search presents novel epistemic opportunities and challenges. 
Autocomplete inevitably and irreparably induces changes in users’ epistemic 
actions, particularly their inquiry and belief formation. While these changes have 
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potential epistemic benefits for searchers and society, they also have harms, such 
as generating false, biased, or skewed beliefs about individuals or members of 
disempowered groups. Our analysis constitutes an example of assigning epistemic 
responsibilities associated with an epistemic technology on a principled theoretical 
basis. Using our theoretical framework that connects responsible epistemic 
behavior to practicability, we considered what corrective measures are 
technologically possible and desirable for each of the candidate responsible parties: 
searchers, the search technology and the search provider. Search providers have 
the bulk of required features and technological possibilities to identify and prevent 
harms. They therefore bear the bulk of responsibility to mitigate them and should 
eliminate autosuggestions that result from organized attacks to game the system, 
those that perpetuate damaging stereotypes about socially disadvantaged groups, 
and those that associate negative characteristics with specific individuals. 
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Notes 
1. In January 2015, Wulff and Google settled the case before trial. Google removed the 
offensive autosuggestions (Huber, 2015). 
2. Karapapa and Borghi (2015) list multiple legal cases around the world, in which Google 
was sued over harms allegedly caused by its autosuggestions. The outcomes of these 
cases have been diverse, and they have not followed a consistent legal logic (Karapapa 
and Borghi, 2015: 263). 
3. Asynchronous communication may be implemented with client-side scripting, Active-X, 
Java, and Flash technology, but these methods are cumbersome and inefficient. 
4. It is safe to assume that search providers other than Google use similar methods. 
5. Google’s Autocomplete cannot be turned off (Google, 2014). 
6. Thanks to Adam Dubé for this point. 
7. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for this point. 
8. For an overview of the debate about group responsibility, see Tollefsen (2004). 
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9. For an entity to be epistemically responsible for its effect on another’s belief formation 
processes, it arguably has to have such an effect, be able to identify potential harms and 
alternative actions, and alter its behavior to avoid such harms. See Jonas (1984), Floridi 
and Sanders (2004) and Wallach and Allen (2009). 
10. We thank Allan Olley for this reference. 
11. For a discussion, see De Maeyer (2013). 
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